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-'In his death, the State has lost one of its best beloved and most
distinguished citizens; this Court an able Judge.
"We move that this brief expression of our sincere regard be
spread upon the records of this Court.
"James D. Shearer,
"Charles W. Farnham,
"Alf. E. Boyesen,
"Thomas S. Vood,
"John D. Sullivan,
"Henry B. Wenzell

"Hugh T. Halbert,
Committee."

NOTES.
THE LAW ScIOOL.-The sixty-second annual session of the
Law School has been inaugurated under the most favorable auspices;
and present indications point to a very successful year.
In the regular teaching force of the school, but few changes
have been made. Mr. Ralph Jackson Baker, who edited the LAW
REVIEW last year and graduated summia curn laudc, in June, has
been elected an Instructor. He will teach courses on Trusts, Equitable Doctrines, and Public Service Corporations. Mr. Harold
Evans, Esq., a graduate of the Law School, class of i9o9, will lecture
on Domestic Relations. Mir. Edward W. Evans, Esq., of the Philadelphia bar and also an alumnus of the school, will supervise the
course in "Office Practice." Mr. Russell S. Wolfe, Esq., of the New
York bar, will deliver a course of lectures on Code Pleading. Mr.
Wolfe is also a graduate of the Law School and a former Editor-inchief of the LAW REVIEW.
On the auxiliary teaching staff, several new names appear. Hon.
W. U. Hensel, of Lancaster, Pa., will deliver a lecture on James
Buchanan. Hon. John W. Gest, whose interesting article on "The
Law and Lawyers of Balzac" appears in this number of the LAW
REVIEW, will lecture on Legal Biography. And Hon. Hampton L.
Carson, of the Philadelphia bar, will take as the subject of a lecture
course, "The History of Legal Literature."
Several changes which have been made in the curriculum,
become operative this year. Instead of first-year Equity, Dean
Lewis will give first-year men a course in Associations, dealing, for
the most part, with the Law of Agency. A new course on Public
Service Corporations is open to third-year men. An interesting
innovation in the form of a course in "Office Practice" will also be
tried out. It has for some time been felt that the Law School should
attempt to teach students to apply in a practical Way some of the
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legal theory which forms the basis of the regular courses of instruc-

tion. The course in "Office Practice" has this purpose in view.
Four practical problems have been laid before the members of each
of the three classes in the Law School; and no student can be advanced to a higher class, or graduated, who has not solved the problems to the satisfaction of the supervisor of the course. For instance,
members of the third-year class will be required, before graduation,
to write a will, validly making given dispositions of the fictitious testator's property; to draw a mortgage; to form a corporation, preparing the Certificate of Incorporation, the notice which must be
published, proof of publication thereof, calls for the first meetings
of stockholders and directors, and minutes of the first meeting; and
to prepare all the papers necessary to properly bring a suit in
assumpsit. For the first and second year classes similar problems
have been prepared.
The number of students in attendance at the Law School is the
largest since i9o2. The registrations in the various classes are as
follows: Third year class, 8i; Second year class, ioo; First year
class. 175. There are also registered, eight special students, one
partial student and two graduate students, bringing, the total registrations up to 367. Only once before in the history of the Law
School has the attendance been so large.
CORPORATIOMS-ULTRA VxIREs Acrs-Accom .MODATION PAPER.
-In a proceeding in equity against an insolvent corporation the
receivers reported, in respect to claims presented by several banks
arising on negotiable promissory notes, that the defendant corporation was an accommodation indorser. The Court held that although
the execution or indorsement of accommodation paper is an act
beyond the scope of corporate authority, the innocent holder for
value of such paper could recover on it. It appeared, However, on
all the evidence, that the banks could not be considered holders
without notice.'
* "The proposition is well supported by authority that it is ultra
vires of a corporation to execute accommodation paper or to. enter
into contracts of guaranty or suretyship not in furtherance of its
business, unless given express authority to do so." 2 Counsel for
the receivers urged that the Court declare the paper void ab initio,
adopting the doctrine stated in an opinion by Mr. Justice Gray in
respect to contracts ultra zvrcs. "The charter of a corporation

*

*

*

is the measure of its powers

*

*

*

All contracts

'Johnson v. Johnson Bros., 8o AtI. Rep. 74z (Me. igmt).
' (a) Note to In re Assignment Mutual, etc., 7o Am. St. Rep. 164;
(b) 3 Thorn. Corp., 2nd Ed., § 2225 and cases cited; (c) 7 Am. and Eng.
Ency. Law, 2nd Ed., 793; (d) i Mora. Corps., 2nd Ed., § 43 and cases

cited.
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made beyond the scope of those powers are unlawful and void, and
no action can be maintained upon then in the courts, and this upon
three distinct grounds; the obligation of everyone contracting with
a corporation to take notice of the legal limits of its powers; the
interest of the stockholders not to be subjected to risks they have
never undertaken; and above all, the interest of the public that the
corporation shall not transcend the powers conferred' upon it by
law."' The Court, however, refused to apply this rule, characterizing it as too rigid. Quoting from the opinion in a recent case, it
said: "'It would see from the later opinion of courts and jurists
that the doctrine of ultra vires is thought to have been heretofore
too often and too strictly applied, especially in cases of contracts
of corporations (other than municipal, at least), not in themselves
harmful to the public." '
That such is the tendency is undoubtedly true. Mr. Freeman 5
says: "After a study of the cases * * * the impression is
forced upon us, that the doctrine of ultra vires as applied to contracts of private corporations, has almost lost its meaning. The
undermining of the foundation upon which it has rested from its
inception has proceeded simultaneously from different directions
until the doctrine itself seems almost ready to fall under its own
weight." Mr. Seymour D. Thompson, after tracing the development of what he calls "The Revolt against the Doctrine of Ultra
Vires," declares: "My own view is that the doctrine of ultra vires
has no proper place in the law of private corporations except in
respect of contracts which are bad in themselves, the making of which
is prohibited by considerations of public morality, of justice or of
a sound public policy, and which stand upon such a footing that
neither party can be regarded as innocent or blameless in entering into
them." 6 Mr. Lilienthal says, "We have seen how the doctrine
of ultra vires, irrespective of the question of State interference, has
developed or rather disintegrated"; - while Mr. George Wharton
Pepper acknowledges that, "If we return from the domain of theory
to our final survey of existing conditions in American courts, it seems
hard to escape a conclusion favorable to the view which results
in the enforcement, in so many cases, of unauthorized and prohibited
contracts." 8
It is submitted, however, that it was unnecessary to consider
the "rigid" or the "more reasonable" doctrine. It is established
beyond controversy that "notwithstanding the rule that corporations
have no power to make or endorse negotiable paper for accommoda'Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman Car Co., i39 U. S. 24 (i890).
'Oakland Electric Co. v. Union Gas and Electric Co., io7 Me. 279 (1910).
"Supra, note 2 (a).
28 Am. Law Rev. 397, 398.
ii Ha. L. R. 396.
"9 Haw. I- R. 27j.
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tion, such paper will be good in the hands of an innocent purchaser
for -alue without notice of such fact." 9 "'Unless the corporation
be specially authorized to do so. the execution or endorsement of
accommodation paper for the benefit of a third person is an act
beyond the scope of its corporate authority but * * * a bona
fidc holder taking without notice of its character could enforce it." "*
The rule is stated flatly in an early case as an incontrovertible
proposition needing no citation of authorities,"' but it is admittedly
an exception to the general doctrine of ultra %'ircsin favor of negotiable paper, and a rather difficult one to support by any rule of
logic. Nevertheless an analogy is found in cases where an agent is
given authority to execute commercial paper in the business of his
principal and in excess of his authority he executes paper for his
own benefit. In such case the tendency throughout the United States
is to allow the innocent holder for value to recover against the
principal. 2 This is an exception to the general rule exempting the
principal from liability for acts of an agent beyond the scope of his
authority. In view of the fact that both parties are innocent and
both have trusted the fraudulent agent it may well be asked: Why
should the principal be liable? It may be said that the principal
inaugurated the sequence of events causing the plaintiff to act to
his detriment by conferring power upon the agent. But this is not
true in the particular instance mentioned.
The same arguments are applicable to the case where a corporation issues accommodation paper ultra vires. It is said that it is the
obligation of every one contracting with a corporation to take notice
of the legal limitations of its powers. It is well settled that "private
corporations, unless prohibited by charter or statute have the implied
power to execute promissory notes or other evidences of indebtedness, in payment or settlement of all debts, in the course of the
execution of their corporate purposes." 1 3 A corporation having the
power to issue notes, exercises that power wrongfully, by issuing
accommodation paper. This is unknown to the party contracting
with the corporation and as a practical matter is incapable of discovery by him. 'Again there is a balancing of equities between the
innocent holder for value and the corporation, i. c., the stockholders,
who are also innocent. The law has favored the former, thus conforming to the well established policy of the law merchant of avoiding any rule tending to hinder the free circulation of negotiable
paper.
E. H. B., Jr.
93 Thorn. Corp., 2nd Ed., j

2228 and cases cited.
"i Daniel Neg. Inst., 4th Ed., §386.
"Bird Y. Daggett. 97 Mass. 494 (1867).

'North River Bank'v. Ayvmar, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 262 (1842).
"3 Thor Corp. and Ed., §2i85.
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EVIDENCE-BREACI

OF PROMISE TO M'ARRY-CHtARACTER.-An

ol. but perplexing and intere.ting. question is raised in the recent
case of McKane v. Howard.' The defendant, in a breach of promise
suit, pleaded that prior to the alleged contract, the plaintiff had been
guilty of criminal conversation with (livers men; and that the defendant was ignorant of this fact at the time of making the alleged
promise. In rebuttai, the plaintiff offered testimony that her reputation for chastity was good; and the evidence was admitted over
the objection of the defendant. Damages were awarded the plaintiff
in the court below; but the Court of Appeals decided that evidence
of the plaintiff's good character had been improperly admitted.
"The testimony of her witnesses that her reputation was good did
not meet dr respond to the issue; it did not prove or tend to prove
that she was not guilty of each illicit act testified to by the defendant's witnesses. * * * The character of a party in a civil case
cannot be looked to as evidence that she did or did not do an act
charged. * * * Defendant's evidence being directed io prove a
defence, and not that her general character for chastity was bad,
because of which damages should be diminished, though reaching
to the fact of character, was not such an attack on general character
for chastity as would permit the plaintiff to introduce evidence of
her good reputation for chastity."
It is a rule of law, that in civil proceedings, unless the character of a party be directly put in issue by the proceeding itself,
evidence of general character is not admissible, not only because of
its slight probative value, but also because of its tendency unnecessarily to confuse the issues.2 Reputed character is always to be
considered by the jury in mitigation of damages in an action in
which the harm to reputation is recognized as an element of recovery,
as, for instance, the daughter's reputation for chastity in a father's
action for seduction; ' the reputation of the plaintiff in an action for
malicious prosecution, 4 or in a suit for breach of promise to marry.5
On the face of it, the principal case seems to be correct in principle;
and, it is, in fact, supported by some eminent authorities.
In a leading Pennsylvania case I on the subject, Woodward, J.,
said: "He (the defendant) proved a specific fact-a gross indiscretion on the part of the plaintiff in suffering Reed to take liberties
with her person. True, the good character of the party increases
the improbability of an alleged crime, but it does not disprove it.
* * * Evidence of character never avails against positive and
direct proof." In a late Massachusetts case' the defendant proved
'95 N. E. Rep. 642 (N. Y. x91).'
S

1 Greenleaf 40; Day v. Ross, 154 Mass. 13 (1891).

'Hoffman v. Kem.rer, 44 Pa. 452 (1863).
'Bacon v. Towne, 4 Cush. 240 (Mass. 1849).
5
Burnett v. Simpkins, 24 I1. 267 (i86o).
'Leckey v. Bloser, 24 Pa. 401 (1855).
' Colburne v. Marble, 196 Mass. 376 (9o7).
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specific acts of unchastity on the part of the plaintiff, and the court
declared that he did not thereby open the field to the plaintiff to offer
evidence to support her reputation.
Courts of other jurisdictions take an opposite view which
although it seems to represent the weight of authority, numerically
speaking, is not ipso facto the better rule. It has been held by an
Indiana court that "the appellant's testimony (showing specific acts
of unchastity) put her character in issue, and it would be a harsh
rule that would not allow her to vindicate her character." 8 And,
to use the words of an Illinois court, "Then (when specific acts of
immorality are pleaded) the attack upon the character of the plaintiff
is as direct as in the case of an indictment for a crime. And no
reason is perceived why, when such attack is made, although it
comes from a defendant instead of a plaintiff, the latter should not
be permitted to prove general good character, for the purpose of
To the
rendering it improbable that the charge is well founded."
same effect are decisions in other jurisdictions. 10
It is submitted that the fallacy in this line of reasoning lies in
the statement that the plaintiff's character is attacked by such a
defense. This statement is manifestly incorrect. Her character is
not attacked in any legal sense, and consequently is not in issue.
It is clear that the reputed character or reputation of a person is not
attacked in any legal sense by the affirmative proof of specific acts
of immorality. Specific acts of misconduct do not evidence bad
reputation, and a fortiori good reputation does not tend to prove the
non-commission of improper acts. Admitting this reasonable view,
the principal case seems to be strictly correct in theory, and the cases
contra seem to have turned on the courts' ostensible determination
to allow a person's good reputation to be upheld at all hazards and
without regard to fundamental rules of evidence.

M.G.
PROPERTY-RIGHT AS BETWEEN LIFE TENANT AND REMAINDERMAN IN DISTRIBUTION MADE BY A CORPORATION.--The question
1 whether a dis-

raised in Newport Trust Co. v. Van Rensselaer,
tribution made by a corporation during the continuance of a life
estate is to be treated as income or capital, and, accordingly, belongs
to life tenant or remainderman, is primarily a question of the intention manifested by the will or other instrument by which the
right to the income is, for the time being, severed from the corpus.
'Jones v. Layman, x23 Ind. 569 (1889).

*Sprague v. Craig,
"Smith

590 (,go).
1 78

51

11. 288 (z869).

v. Hall, 69 Conn. 651 (x897); Harriman v. Layman, 118 Ia.

Atl. Rep. ioo9 "(R. L 19ix).
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This is expressly or impliedly recognized by all the cases on the
subject.2
In most cases the instrument merely directs the payment of
"earnings," or "income," or occasionally "dividends" to the life
tenant; and such terms are not sufficiently explicit to furnish a rule
for the guidance of a court when the distribution by the corporation is of an unusual or extraordinary nature. And it is mainly on
the disposition of such dividends that the courts differ. The general rule applying to ordinary distributions is that a regular cash
dividend belongs to the person holding the stock at the time the
dividend is declared.' The case of a life tenant dying between the
declaration and the payment of a dividend, seems not to have arisen
in America; but in Wright v. Tuckett,4 Vice-Chancellor Wood
adhered to the general rule, and directed the dividend to be paid to
the representative of the tenant for life. Since a dividend is not due
when declared, and since stockholders have no legal title to the
profits of the business until a division is made,- it is submitted that
a better rule would be to give the dividend to the person having the
beneficial interest in the stock at the time the dividend is payable.
It is also to be observed that the conflict of opinion previously
mentioned is confined to distributions which are made from earnings past and current. The courts substantially agree that a dividend, so called, whether in the form of cash or stock, which represents a reduction or enhancement of the value of assets representing
capital, from sources other than the accumulation of earnings, belongs
to the corpus and not to the income.s
In the principal case the court was confronted with the disposition of an extraordinary dividend. The D., L. & W. R. R. Co.
organized a coal company, and declared a dividend of 50 per cent.
to stockholders of the railroad company, payable in cash or part to
be paid to the coal company for stock therein. The organization of
62

'Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549 (8qo); Spooner v.Phillips, 62 Conn.
(1892); Thomas v.Gregg, 78 Md. 545 (1894).
'Bates v.Mackinley, 3t Beav. 28o (Eng. 1862); Matter of Kernochan.
§2201; Taylor on Priv. Corp.,

IO4 N. Y. 618 (1887); 2 Thompson on Corp.,
'i

John. & Hem. 266 (Eng. x86o).

'Robertson v. de Brulatour, 188 N. Y. 3o (1907); Waterman v. Alden,

42

Ill. App. 294 (1891).

"Kalbach v. Clark, 133 Iowa 215 (i9o7); Hite v. I-ite, 93 Ky. 257 (1892);
Gilkey v. Paine, 8o Me. 319 (i888); Walker v.Walker, 68 N. H. 407 (1895);

and see Pritchitt v. Nashville Trust Co., o6 Tenn. 472 (x896) for a full
discussion of the subject of this note. For a novel analysis of a stock dividend,
and its division according to its sources, see Carter v. Crehore, 12 Haw.
309 (9oo).
An apparent exception to this general rule is found in cases where the
business is such that the capital, in the ordinary course of the company's
activities, is being consumed or undergoing changes of form, e. g., a land
company. Reed v. Head, 88 Mass. 174 (1863); Thomson's Est., 153 Pa. 332

(1893).
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the coal-.,elling company was the railroad's method of complying
with the decision of the United States Supreme Court" that it could
not carry its own coal; and the coal company accordingly contracted
to buy all the coal mined by the railroad company at the mines.
Though not a tangible asset, the company gave up a valuable rightto sell its coal at the market. The coal company capitalized the
profit to be made out of this re-sale; so it is apparent that the railroad gave up a means of income. But the road received nothing for
this right or asset; so that it had no new fund out of which to declare
the dividend. The distribution was, therefore, an unusual cash dividend from earnings past and current.
There are four well defined lines of decision on the disposition
of such a dividend. The early English rule, now practically obsolete and of little more than historical interest, gave all extraordinary
or unusual dividends, whether of stock or cash, to the "remainderman.8 The later English rule, commonly called the Massachusetts
rule, regards cash dividends, however large, as income, and stock
dividends, however made, as capital.9 This rule is not as simple of
application as it appears, because the inquiry must first be made
"whether such distribution is an apportionment of additional stock
representing capital or a division of profits and income." 10 This
rule 4oes not inquire whether the dividend was earned before the
death of the testator or during the life tenancy; and disposition is
made irrespective of the period covered by the accumulation of the
fund from which it is declared. Likewise in New York and Kentucky the courts flatly reject the principle of apportionment between
capital and income, and give any dividend, whether stock or cash,
to the life tenant.11 The Pennsylvania rule, often called the American rule, like the New York rule, refuses to let the character of
the dividend control its distribution; but unlike both Massachusetts
and New York rules, inquires when the fund out of which the dividerid is paid,, was accumulated. In the leading case in which the
court applied this equitable rule,'2 it had to distribute a stock dividend; but the same principle
of apportionment has been applied in
13
cases of cash dividends.
1 U.

S. v.D., I & V. R. R. Co., 213 U. S. 366 (igo8).
'Brauder v. Brauder, 4 Ves. Jr. 8oo (Eng. 1799); Irving v. Houston
4 Paton Sc. App. (Eng. 1893). But see qualification of this case in Bouch v.
Sproule, L R. z2 App. Cas. 385 (1887).
'Sproule v. Bouch, L. IL 29 Ch. D. 635 (I885), opinion of Fry, J., quoted
with approval by Lord Herschell in Bouch v. Sproule, supra; In re Alsbury.
L. R-45 Ch. D. 237 (189o) ; Green v. Bissell, 79 Conn. 547 (i9o7) ; Waterman
v. Alden, supra; Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. ioi (1868).
" Mr. Justice Gray. in Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U S. 549 (i89o), which
approves the Massachusetts rule.
" Hite v. Hite, supra: Robertson v. de Brulatour, supra. And see Chester
v. Buffalo Co., 7o App. Div. 443 (N. Y. i9oz).
'Earp's Appeal, 28 -Pa. 368 (x857).
'Van Doren v. Alden, x9 N. J. Eq. 176 (i868); Holbrook v. Holbrook,
74 N. H. 201 (igo7); Oliver's Est., 136 Pa. 43 (i8go).
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The trustee in the principal case took half the divilend in stock
in the coal company. and the other half in cash. But the case differs
from the usual case of a stock dividend, for here the stock in
effect given to stockholders, was stock in another company. There
was no controversy over the stock, so that the interesting question

of the right to subscribe to new stock was not raised. The court
had to dispose of tle cash only; and its decision, together with
Petition of Brown,14 brings Rhode Island in line with the Massachusetts rule.
C.L.M.

SALEs-DELIVERY OF GOODs DIFFERING FROM TiE DESCRIPTION

GIVE.N.-The question of the liability of a seller of seeds upon
warranties of their identity has been productive of much discussion
and litigation. A case on this subject, presenting a rather interesting
problem, was recently decided in the House of Lords.' A quantity
of seed, described as "common English sainfoin," was sold, the following provision being one of the conditions of the sale: "Sellers
give no warranty, express or implied, as to growth, description, or
any other matters." The seed was re-sold by the buyer, and was
later discovered to be "giant sainfoin" and not "common English
sainfoin." Of this fact the buyer was ignorant at the time of the
sale, as the appearance of the two varieties of seed is substantially
identical. The buyer. therefore, sued the seller for damages. in
the Court of Appeal ' he was unsuccessful; but the House of Lords
allowed recovery.
Both courts agreed that in a sale by description, it is an implied
condition of the sale that the goods furnished be of the same description as those contracted for. Further, upon a breach of this
condition, the buyer may do either one of two things: reject the
goods, or accept them
and sue for damages. Up to this point there
to his rights.
is no doubt as
This difficulty is, however, now encountered. The courts, in
defining the buyer's right to sue for damages upon acceptance of
the goods, have invariably said that he can no longer treat the conditions as such, but only as an agreement, a representation, or a
warranty. The rule is usually stated somewhat as follows: "If,
indeed, he" (the buyer) "has received the whole, or any substantial
part, of the consideration for the promise on his part, the warranty
loses the character of a condition, or. to speak more properly, perhaps, ceases to be available as a condition, and becomes a warranty
in the narrow sense of the word, namely, a stipulation by way of
114 R. I. 371 (1884).
'Wallis v. Pratt, App. Cas. in1,
279

L. J. K. B. io3.

394.
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agreement, for the breach of which compensation must be sought
in damages."
These statements are all, if not incorrect, at least
most confusing.
If it is true that the condition becomes a warranty upon acceptance of the goods, it follows that a buyer is remediless when
there is a non-warranty clause in the contract .of sale. This was
the conclusion of a majority of the judges in the Court of Appeal
in the principal case. The logic of such a position is compelling.
But a dissenting opinion by Fletcher Moulton, L. J., considered so
satisfactory by the House of Lords that they delivered only short
opinions affirming it, looks beneath the surface of the mere words
so constantly .used by courts and text-writers, and embodied in the
Sales Acts, and analyzes the true nature of a condition.
A condition is an implied contract, for breach of which the
buyer has two remedies, viz., that of rejecting the goods and treating the contract of sale as rescinded, or that of suing for damages.
It is error to conceive of an acceptance of the goods as operating
an automatic substitution of a warranty for the condition. When the
buyer accepts the goods, he does not thereby waive the conditions;
he merely waives one of his remedies therefor. Consequently, the
buyer's rights to sue, being independent of any warranty created for
the purpose, are not affected by a non-warranty clause in the contract
of sale.
The decision of the House of Lords should have the effect of
dispersing much of the confusion that has enveloped the distinction
between warranties and conditions. The simple fact that one of
the remedies for a breach of the latter is also a remedy for a breach
of the former, does not, when the buyer avails himself of it, destroy
the identity of the condition as such. Whether the obligation in
question is a condition or a warranty depends upon the construction
of the contract of sale, and not upon matter subsequent thereto.
Such matter may take away the superior legal advantages of a condition, as compared with those of a warranty, but does not make it a
warranty.
N. S.
Statements
J., may
in Behn
v.Burness.
32 1o Williams,
tothe
same effct
be found
in Ellen
v. J.
Topp,
6 204
E-x. (1863).
424 (85),
and in
entsches v. Taylor, 2 Q. B. 274 (1893).
Mr. Benjamin states the ride in
much the same language. Benjamin on Sales, 562. The English Sales of
Goods Act of z893 (generally considered a codification of the pre-existing
law on this point) says (Sec. 1x, Sub.-sec. i, Cic.), "Where a contract of sale
is not severable and the buyer has accepted the goods or part thereof, or
where the contract is for specific goods, the property in which has passed to
the buyer, the breach of any condition to be fulfilled by the seller can only be
treated as a breach of warranty, and not as a ground for rejecting the goods."
The American Sales Act, Sec. xx, provides that "where the obligations of
either party to a contract to sell or a sale are subject to any condition which
is not performed, such party may refuse to proceed with the contract or sale,
or he may waive performance of the condition. If the other party has promised that the condition shall happen or be performed, such first-mentioned
party may also treat the non-performance of -the condition as a breach of

warranty.0
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The combination of circumstances found in the principal case
is one not likely often to arise. There seems to be only one other
decision on similar facts, and it was decided the same way.4 The
recent decision would; therefore, seem to settle the English law on
this point.
P.V.R.M.

WASTE-RIGHT OF MORTGAGEE To RESTRAIN THE MORTGAGOR

IN PossEsxoN.-There is a Delaware statute which gives the Chancellor power to restrain waste upon mortgaged premises upon
petition of' the mortgagee. In the case of Ennis v. Smith, et al.,1 it
appeared that the mortgagor had made a contract with a third party
to fell and remove certain timber standing on the mortgaged premises. Part of the timber had already been felled, but was still on
the mortgaged premises, when the mortgagee secured an injunction
to restrain further cutting and to prevent the removal of what was
already cut. The court, showing that the statute mentioned was
merely an affirmance of a jurisdiction theretofore exercised by the
Courts of Chancery, readily granted an order to restrain future
cutting, but experienced considerable difficulty in determining
whether the trees already felled might be removed or not. After
apparent hesitation it granted an order, restraining the removal of
the trees cut prior to the service of the preliminary decree, conditional upon the mortgagee's giving bond to indemnify the defendant if it should appear that they were correct in their contention that
the order should not cover the removal of the trees already cut.
It appeared in the case that the mortgagor was insolvent, though
the other defendant was solvent. The mortgage was overdue by
reason of the failure of the mortgagor to pay a part of the debt,
and therefore the legal title to the premises was in the plaintiff.
A study of the authorities shows that the hesitancy of the
Chancellor in extending the injunction to cover the removal of the
timber already cut, was proper. The courts in all common law
jurisdictions have uniformly granted injunctions upon prayer of
the mortgagee to restrain future waste upon the mortgaged premises
such as would materially impair the security.2 Whether the mortgage is to be considered as passing the legal title oor as merely giving a lien for the debt,4 seems not to have been considered by the
courts in giving this remedy. In the case under discussion, however, the mortgage being over-due, the mortgages had an undoubted
4
Howcroft v. Laycock, 14 Times L R. 46o (x898).
'8o Atl. Rep. 636 (Del. 19i1).
2 King v. Smith, 2 Hare 239 (Eng. x843); Delano v. Smith, 2o6 Mass. 365

1910).

*Prudential Ins. Co. v. Guild, 64 AtI. Rep. 694 (N. J. 19o6).
4
Williams v. Chicago Exhibition Co., x88 IlL ig (19oo).

NOTES

legal title to the premises, even if the mortgage itself did not give
him a legal estate. Having a legal estate in the premises, he had
a complete and adequate remedy at law. He might have brought
trespass for waste.: He also had an action of 'replevin for timber
cut and removed," inasmuch as it is a principle of the common
law that property severed from the realty so as to become a chattel,
belongs to the legal owner of the land-the mortgagee in the present
case. Hence the mortgagee, having such interest in the land, and
the actual and constructive possession, may maintain an action for
the value of the property severed, or an action for specific chattels1
either in the nature of a replevin ' or trover.'
The court, in the principal case, cited in its opinion, Bank of
Chenango v. Cox; "obut that case should not have controlled the
court because the courts of New Jersey take a unique view of the
mortgagee's legal estate, and give him no legal remedy based upon
the constructive right of possession which is in him. 1 The courts
of other states have permitted the mortgagor to claim timber in the
In the case at bar the
hands of a purchaser from the mortgagor.
mortgagees remedies at law were complete and adequate if the
defendants persisted in their wrongdoing. It did not appear that
both parties were insolvent even if that be an important factor in
the case. Chancellor Kent declared the law on this subject in a
case which involved a similar state of facts: 3 "It would seem
then, to be a stretch of jurisdiction to apply the injunction to this
incidental remedy, and to stay the use or disposition of the chattel
This would be enlarging the substituted remedy in this court much
beyond the remedy at law. * * * There must be a very special
case made out to authorize me to go so far, and such cases may be
supposed. A lease, for instance, may have been fraudulently procured by an insolvent person, for the very purpose of plundering
the timber under shelter of it. I do not mean to be understood to
say'that the Court will never interfere; but that it ought not to be
done in ordinary cases like this."
In view of the authorities cited it would appear that the injunction issued by the Delaware court should not have restrained the
removal of the timber already cut. The extraordinary circumstances
declared by Kent to be the foundation of the order do not appear in
the case.
L.P.S.
'Stowell v. Pike, 2 Me. 387 (1823).
'Waterman v. Matteson, 4 IL I. 539 (1857).
"Johnson v. Bratton, 112 Mich. 319 (1897).
'Dorr v. Dudderar, 88 I1. xo7 (1878).
Searle v. Sawyer, 127 ,Mass. 49i (1879).

N. J. Eq. 452 (1875).
"Kircher v. Schalk, 39 N. J. L 335 (1877).
Frothingham v. MiKusick, 24 Me. 403 (1844).
Watson v. Hunter 5 Johns. Ch. 169 (182t).
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NOTES
WILLS-PARTIAL REVOCATION.-In Hartz v. Sobel,' the testatrix had inserted in her will. bequests of $jooo to each of two

nephews, who were likewise appointed executors. Subsequently, she
took a sharp instrument, cut the name of one of the nephews out of
the bequest and the clause appointing executors, and changed the
plural of the words "nephews," "executors" and "children," to the
singular. The will was not re-executed. Upon the death of the
testatrix, the Will, in its mutilated condition, was found, together
with a duplicate copy of the original instrument. In deciding the
case, under the statute.2 Lumpkin, J.. after an historical consideration
of the subject and an elaborate review of the authorities, held that
the revocation was not accomplished by any of the statutory methods,
and was, therefore, ineffective; and the duplicate copy was admitted
in evidence to prove the original bequests and appointments.
The law in regard to the revocation of wills is by no means
uniform. Under the Statute of Frauds.3 it was well recognized that
a partial revocation was permissible and the obliteration or excision
of words or clauses, unless of a material part of the will, was regarded as a revocation pro tan to only.4

In those States of the United

States where the Statute of Frauds is in force, a similar interpreta-

tion is given to it.5
By the provisions of the Statute I Vict. c. 26, this doctrine
has been abolished in England. The law in England now seems to
be that a partial revocation is of non-effect and where the original
testamentary disposition is discernible on the face of the instrument,
the will will be probated as originally executed.- Parol evidence,
'71

S. E. Rep. 995 (Ga. Igx1).

'Code of 1863. sec. 244!: "An express revocation may be effected by any
destruction or obliteration of the original will or a duplicate, done by the

testator or by his directions with an intention to revoke; such intention will
be presumed from the obliteration or canceling of a material portion of the
will. but if the part canceled be immaterial, such as the seal, no such pre-

sumption arises."
'29 Car. II: "No device in writing of any lands, tenements or hereditaments. nor any rlause thereof, shall be revocable otherwise than by burning,
canceling, tearing or obliterating."

"Burkitt v. Burkitt, 2 Vern. 498 (1705); Sutton v. Sutton, Cowp. 812

(1778) ; Larkins v. Larkins. 3 Bos. and Pul. 16 (182) ; Mence v. Mence, 18

Ves. 348 (18xi) : Roberts v. Round, Hagg. Eccl. 548 (i83o); Francis v. Grover.
5 Hare, 39 (1845).
'SVheeler v. Bent, 24 Mass. 61 (x828) ; In the Will of Kirkpatrick, 22 N.
J. Eq. 463 (1871) : Cogbill v. Coghill. 2 H. and M. (Va.) 467 (i8o8) ; Stover
v. Kendall, I Cold. (Tenn.) 557 (i86o); Wells v. Wells, 4 B. 'Mon. (Ky.)
152 (x826).

"No obliteration, interlineation or other alteration made in any will after
the execution thereof shall be valid or have any effect except so far as the
words or effect of the will before such alteration shall not be apparent, unless
such alteration shall be executed in like manner as hereinbefore prescribed,"

etc.

' In the Goods of Stone, i Sw. and Tr. 238 (I858); In the Goods of Parr,
L. J. 29 P. and D. 70 (1859) ; In the Goods of Leach, 23 L. T. xit (i89o).

NOTES

however, is inadmissible to establish the contents of the original

document,* unless the doctrine of dependent relative revocation is
applied.

The law in the various United States jurisdictions adopts one
or the other of the above viewpoints, depending upon whether or not
the re-enactment of the Statute of Frauds in ihe particular jurisdiction contains the words "or any part." The majority of jurisdictions seem to have omitted these words; and the law, as presented
in the leading case, represents the weight of authority,1 ' although
some courts base their decisions on the principle of dependent relative
revowation. '

C.A.S.

'Townley v. Watson, 3 Curt. 761 (1844).
*In the Goods of McCabe, L R. 3 P. and D. 94 (873).
368 (1872);
" Simrell's Est., 154 Pa. 604 .(1893); Wolf v. Bollinger, 62 111.
Giffin v. Brooks, 48 Ohio St. 211 (1891) ; Clark v. Smith, 34 Barb. 140 (86x);

Gay v. Gay, 60 la. 415 (882).
'Gardner v. Gardiler, 65 N. H. -3o (1889); Doane v. Hadlock, 42 Me.
72 (x856).

